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Abstract 
Reasoning with model-based representations is an intuitive paradigm, which has been shown 
to be theoretically sound and to possess some computational advantages over reasoning with 
formula-based representations of knowledge. This paper studies these representations and further 
substantiates the claim regarding their advantages. In particular, model-based representations are 
shown to efficiently support reasoning in the presence of varying context information, handle 
efficiently fragments of Reiter’s default logic and provide a useful way to integrate learning 
with reasoning. Furthermore, these results are closely related to the notion of relevance. The use 
of relevance information is best exemplified by the filtering process involved in the algorithm 
developed for reasoning within context. The relation of defaults to relevance is viewed through 
the notion of context, where the agent has to find plausible context information by using default 
rules. This view yields efficient algorithms for default reasoning. Finally, it is argued that these 
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1. Introduction 
A considerable amount of work on the theoretical foundations of artificial intelligence 
has been devoted to capturing some of the intuitive notions of human reasoning. An 
introspective view suggests that the notion of relevance is central to human reasoning. 
Many “common-sense” reasoning situations are characterized by the abundance of po- 
tentially relevant information sources. Yet, humans seem to pick up just the relevant 
information and ignore the irrelevant. This ability may account for the speed with which 
reasoning is performed in everyday situations. In this paper, relevance is viewed as a 
notion that can be used to reduce the computational cost of reasoning, by focusing on 
information that pertains to the situation or task at hand, and ignoring the information 
which does not bear on this situation. We study several tasks in the framework of logi- 
cal reasoning, and show that relevance information can indeed be useful. In particular, 
we show that when performing reasoning with models-namely, when reasoning is per- 
formed by considering examples from the world we reason about-relevance information 
can be used to efficiently tackle several reasoning tasks. 
The generally accepted framework for the study of reasoning in intelligent systems 
is the knowledge-based system approach. The idea is to store the knowledge in some 
representation language with a well defined meaning assigned to its sentences. The 
sentences are stored in a knowledge base (KB) which is combined with a reasoning 
mechanism that is used to determine what can be inferred from the sentences in the 
KB. Various knowledge representations can be used to represent he knowledge in a 
knowledge-based system. Different representation systems (e.g., a set of logical rules, 
a probabilistic network) are associated with corresponding reasoning mechanisms, each 
with its own merits and range of applications [14,181. Given a logical knowledge 
base, for example, reasoning can be abstracted as a deduction task: determine whether a 
sentence, assumed to capture the situation at hand, is logically implied by the knowledge 
base. 
It is also widely agreed that a large part of our everyday reasoning involves arriving 
at conclusions that are not entailed by our “theory” of the world. Many conclusions 
are derived in the absence of information that is sufficient o imply them. This type of 
reasoning is naturally nonmonotonic since further evidence may force us to revise our 
conclusions. Several formalizations trying to capture this situation have been studied, 
and of particular interest o us here are theories for reasoning with “defaults” (see e.g. 
[20] ). In this approach, the true knowledge about the world is augmented by a set 
of default rules that are meant to capture “typical” cases. The quest is for a reasoning 
system that, given a query, responds in a way that agrees with what we know about 
the world and (some of) the default assumptions, and at the same time supports our 
intuition about a plausible conclusion. 
Computational considerations, however, render this approach inadequate for common- 
sense reasoning. This is true not only for the task of deduction, but also for many 
other forms of reasoning that have been developed. All those were shown to be even 
harder to compute than the original formulation [ 23,251. This holds in particular for 
various formalizations of default reasoning [6,17,26], where the increase in complexity 
is clearly at odds with the intuition that reasoning with defaults hould somehow reduce 
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the complexity of reasoning. This remains true, even when we severely restrict the 
expressiveness of the knowledge base, the default rules and the queries allowed. In this 
paper we show that model-based representations can be used to overcome some of the 
above-mentioned difficulties, and that the notion of relevance is useful in deriving these 
results. 
We incorporate the notion of relevance into the study of reasoning by introducing 
the task of reasoning within context. It has been argued that in real life situations, one 
normally completes a lot of missing context information when answering queries [ 121. 
We model this situation by augmenting the agent’s knowledge about the world with 
context-specific information. Reasoning within context is therefore a deduction task, 
where some additional constraining information is added to the knowledge base. We 
formalize this task as the problem of reasoning within a varying context. The intuition 
is that the availability of additional context information should make the reasoning task 
easier, by restricting the domain one needs to reason about. As we show, if the agent 
performs model-based reasoning then context information can be easily used, and yields 
efficient reasoning. 
In model-based reasoning [ 5,9] the knowledge base is represented as a set of models 
(satisfying assignments, examples) of the world rather than a logical formula describing 
it. When a query is presented, reasoning is performed by evaluating the query on these 
models. It is not hard to motivate a model-based approach to reasoning from a cognitive 
point of view and indeed most of the proponents of this approach have been cognitive 
psychologists [ 3,4,11 J, who have alluded to the notion of “reasoning from examples” 
on a qualitative basis. In the AI community this approach can be seen as an example of 
Levesque’s notion of “vivid” reasoning [ 12,131, and is somewhat related to Minsky’s 
frames-theory [ 151 and to some of the work in case-based reasoning [ lo]. 
Given a model-based representation of the knowledge base KB, and a query a, the 
task of deciding whether KB implies cy (denoted KB /= a) can be performed in a 
straightforward way: Evaluate LY on all the models in the representation. If you find 
a model of KB which does not satisfy (Y, then KB &c: a, otherwise conclude that 
KB /= a. Clearly, if the model-based representation contains all the models of KB 
then, by definition, this approach verifies the implication, and yields correct deduction. 
But representing KB by explicitly holding all the possible models is not plausible. A 
model-based approach becomes feasible if KB can be replaced by a small model-based 
representation and still support correct deduction. 
The theory of model-based representations developed in [ 91 (generalizing the the- 
ory developed in [5] for the case of Horn expressions) characterizes the propositional 
languages for which model-based representations upport efficient deduction and abduc- 
tion. It is shown that in many cases in which deduction is NP-hard in the formula- 
based setting, the model-based representation is small (polynomial in the number of 
propositional variables in the domain). Thus, in the model-based setting, correct and 
efficient reasoning can be obtained in cases where such algorithm were not known 
before. 
When reasoning within context, our general knowledge about the world is combined 
with additional constraints, those that are relevant to the current situation, This task 
has an easy and natural implementation when using model-based representations. The 
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algorithm simply filters out models in the representation which are not relevant to the 
current context, namely models that are not consistent with the context information. The 
remaining models are used as before for reasoning with models. The filtering process can 
be performed as a background process whenever the context changes, thereby speeding 
up the reasoning. We characterize several propositional languages for which this simple 
algorithm works correctly and efficiently. We note that reasoning with models is essential 
for providing the computational advantage when reasoning within context. The filtering 
algorithm cannot be performed when reasoning with formulas, and additional context 
information does not necessarily make the task easier. 
Intuitively, the task of default reasoning also aims at capturing some notion of rele- 
vance in that it enforces additional constraints to weed out non-relevant cases and focus 
on the typical cases. In default reasoning [ 191 an agent is given a representation of the 
world, and a set of (sometimes conflicting) default rules, and has to assess whether a 
query q can be concluded “by default”, namely using the standard knowledge and the 
default rules. We show that default reasoning is a generalization of reasoning within con- 
text, in which the reasoner has many context rules, which may be conflicting. Namely, 
default rules do not express explicitly what the relevant context information is, but rather 
implicitly capture all plausible scenarios. While non-typical cases can be ignored, a new 
source of computational difficulty is introduced when default rules are not compatible 
with each other. In this case, the agent can only use a subset of these rules for deriv- 
ing its conclusions, and there may be many possibilities for choosing such subsets. To 
reach a conclusion the agent must enumerate the various possible “contexts” (called 
extensions in default reasoning), and perform the reasoning relative to one context at a 
time. In some sense, the need to search through possible contexts in order to derive a 
conclusion is at odds with the notion of relevance and is the source of the additional 
computational difficulty in default reasoning. 
Nevertheless, we show that in some cases model-based representations provide a way 
out of the computational difficulty. In particular, in these cases, model-based represen- 
tations capture all possible contexts in an accessible form. Thus, one can enumerate the 
contexts, and then use a subroutine for reasoning within context to perform the inference 
task. We give efficient algorithms for (both credulous and skeptical) default reasoning 
tasks, for several classes of world knowledge, default rules and queries. We also show 
that in some cases the task of diagnosis can be performed by similar techniques. Our 
results provide efficient solutions for cases that are not known to be solvable if the 
knowledge base is represented with formulas. 
Our notion of relevance as a way to reduce the computational cost of reasoning can 
be also used at a higher level, that of relevance for the tusk. While above, relevance 
or context information was used to prune the knowledge representation for a particular 
situation, it is also possible to prune a representation relative to a general task. For 
example, if it is known that all the queries presented to the agent come from some 
restricted language then an approximation of KB relative to this language is sufficient 
in order to support correct reasoning with these queries. This idea can be formalized 
using the notion of least upper bound approximations [9,27]. In fact, the model- 
based representations used for reasoning within context and default reasoning capture 
such approximations, and thus use this notion of relevance as well. Here again, the 
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model-based representations are essential since formula-based representations of these 
approximations do not support efficient reasoning. 
Our results show that knowledge, which holds within a specific context and is avail- 
able in a form of a model-based representation, can be used to reason correctly within 
this context. Therefore, our treatment of reasoning within context supports the view that 
an intelligent agent can construct a representation of the world incrementally by pasting 
together many “narrower” views from different contexts. This suggests the notion of 
relevance to the environment. Namely, the agent can incrementally construct a represen- 
tation that is relevant to its environment, in the sense that it supports correct reasoning 
there. This intuitive idea is formalized in a more general setting in the Learning to Rea- 
son framework [ 71, and is discussed also in [ 8,22,3 11. We discuss two results in the 
Learning to Reason framework that use model-based representations in order to exploit 
the relevant information in the reasoning process. 
To summarize, this paper studies reasoning with model-based representations, and 
further substantiates the claim regarding their computational advantages. In particular, 
model-based representations are shown to efficiently support reasoning in the presence 
of varying context information, handle efficiently fragments of Reiter’s default logic and 
provide a useful way to integrate learning with reasoning. On a more philosophical level, 
we suggest that it is useful to view these results through the notion of relevance: the 
computational cost of reasoning can be reduced by using only the information that is 
relevant to the current situation, the general task being performed, or the environment. 
We discuss several aspects of relevance, and show that their use is enabled by model- 
based representations. In particular: 
(1) The use of relevance information is best exemplified by the filtering process 
involved in the algorithm for reasoning within context. 
(2) The relation of defaults to relevance can be viewed through the notion of context, 
resulting in efficient algorithms for default reasoning. 
(3) Relevance information can also be used at a level of a global task by a priori 
restricting the attention to information sufficient for the task. 
(4) The Learning to Reason framework allows for incrementally constructing a 
knowledge representation that is relevant for the environment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce some definitions 
and the notation used throughout the paper. In Section 3 we briefly present some results 
from the theory of reasoning with models. In Section 4 we discuss the task of reasoning 
within context and present an efficient model-based algorithm for it. In Section 5 we 
discuss default reasoning with models and an application to diagnosis. In Section 6 
we discuss knowledge approximations as capturing information relevant for a task. In 
Section 7 we briefly present the Learning to Reason framework and its relation to 
relevance, and Section 8 concludes with a summary. 
2. Preliminaries 
We consider problems of reasoning where the “world” is modeled as a Boolean func- 
tion W : (0, 1)” 4 (0, 1). We use interchangeably the terms propositional expression 
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and Boolean function, and likewise for propositional language and a class of Boolean 
functions. We denote classes of Boolean functions by .7=-, G, and functions by f,g. 
LetX={xr,... , x,,} be a set of variables, each of which is associated with a world’s 
attribute and can take the value 1 or 0 to indicate whether the associated attribute is 
true or false in the world. Assignments are mappings from X to (0, l}, and we treat 
them as elements in (0, 1)" with the natural mapping. Assignments in (0, 1)" are 
denoted by x, y, z, and weight(x) denotes the number of 1 bits in the assignment x. 
A clause is a disjunction of literals, and a CNF formula is a conjunction of clauses. 
For example, (xi V EJ) A (xg V 37 V x4) is a CNF formula with two clauses. A term 
is a conjunction of literals, and a DNF formula is a disjunction of terms. For example, 
(xl AX;?) V (x3 AZfiA x4) is a DNF formula with two terms. A CNF formula is monotone 
if all the literals in it are positive (unnegated). A CNF formula is Horn if every clause 
in it has at most one positive literal. A CNF formula is k-quasi-Horn if there are at 
most k positive literals in each clause. It is a k-quasi-reversed-Horn if there are at most 
k negative literals in each clause. A DNF formula is k-quasi-monotone DNF if there are 
at most k negative literals in each term. 
Every Boolean function has many possible representations and, in particular, both a 
CNF representation and a DNF representation. By the DNF size of f, denoted ]DNF( f) 1, 
we mean the minimum number of terms in any DNF representation of f. Similarly, the 
CNF size of f, denoted \CNF( f) 1, is the minimum number of clauses in any CNF 
representation of f. 
An assignment x E (0, 1)” satisfies f if f(x) = 1; such an assignment x is called a 
model of f. If f is a theory of the “world”, a satisfying assignment of f is sometimes 
referred to in the literature as a possible world. By “f implies g”, denoted f k g, 
we mean that every model of f is also a model of g. Throughout the paper, when no 
confusion can arise, we identify a Boolean function f with the set of its models, namely 
f-’ ( 1) . Observe that the connective “implies” ( k) used between Boolean functions is 
equivalent to the connective “subset or equal” (C) used for subsets of (0, 1)“. That is, 
f + g if and only if f C g. 
3. Reasoning with models 
In this section we briefly present some results from the monotone theory of Boolean 
functions [2] and the theory of reasoning with models [5,9]. All the results in this 
section have appeared elsewhere. For a detailed discussion see [ 91. 
Consider a propositional knowledge base W and let LY be a propositional query. 
The model-based strategy for the deduction problem W + cy is to try and verify the 
implication relation using model evaluation. Fig. 1 describes the algorithm MBR, which 
uses a set of models r as a knowledge base. When presented with a query cy the 
algorithm evaluates (Y on all the models in r. If a counterexample x is found such that 
a(x) = 0, then the algorithm returns “No”. Otherwise it returns “Yes”. 
Clearly, the model-based approach solves the inference problem if r is the set of 
all models (satisfying assignments) of W. However, the set of all models might be 
too large, making this procedure computationally infeasible. A model-based approach 
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Algorithm MBR( r, a) : 
Test set: A set r 2 W of possible assignments. 
Test: If there is an element x E r which does not satisfy a, return “No”. 
Otherwise, return “Yes”. 
Fig. 1. MBR: model-based reasoning 
becomes useful if one can show that it is possible to use a fairly small set of models as 
the test set, and still perform reasonably good inference. 
In the rest of this section we describe general conditions under which this can be 
done. An example of the technical notions presented here is given at the end of the 
section. 
3.1. Monotone theory 
Definition 1 (Order). We denote by 6 the usual partial order on the lattice (0, l}“, 
the one induced by the order 0 < 1. That is, for x,y E (0, l}“, x < y if and only if Vi, 
xi ,< yi. For an assignment b E (0, 1)” we define x &, y if and only if x ~3 b < y @ b 
(Here @ is the bitwise addition modulo 2.) We say that x > y if and only if x > y and 
x # y. 
Intuitively, if bi = 0 then the order relation on the ith bit is the normal order; if bi = 1, 
the order relation is reversed, that is, 1 <b; 0. 
The monotone extension of z E (0, 1)” with respect to b is defined as 
Mb(Z) = {x 1 x ab z}. 
The monotone extension off with respect to b is defined as 
Mb(f) = {x 1 x &, z, for some z E f}. 
Notice that throughout we treat the function f as the set of its satisfying assignments, 
and therefore the above notation is natural. The set of minimal assignments of f with 
respect to b is defined as 
mjn(f> = {z 1 z E f, such that Vy E f, z #by}. 
Definition 2 (Basis). A set B is a basis for f if f = jjbEB Mb( f). B is a basis for a 
class of functions F if it is a basis for all the functions in F. 
The importance of these definitions [2] is that every Boolean function has a basis B, 
and can be represented as follows: 
f = /jJ%(f) = /j v Mb(z) (1) 
&B bEB zEminb(f) 
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This representation yields a necessary and sufficient condition describing when x E 
{0, 1)” satisfies f: 
Corollary 3. Let B be a basis for f, and x E (0, l}n. Then, f(n) = 1 if and only if 
for every basis element b E B there exists z E minb( f) such that x >b z. 
It is known [2] that for every b, the size of minb( f) is bounded by the size of its 
DNF representation. Further, a set of assignments which falsify every clause in a CNF 
representation of f is a basis for f. Therefore, f has a basis whose size is bounded by 
1 CNF( f) /. Some important function classes have a small fixed basis, irrespective of the 
CNF size of the function: 
l Horn formulas: A basis for this class is BH = {u E (0, 1)” ( weight(u) > n - l}, 
since every Horn clause is falsified by an assignment in BH. Clearly, J&J = n + 1. 
l k-quasi-Horn formulas: BH~ = {u E {0, 1)” 1 weight(u) 3 n - k} is a basis for this 
class. Clearly, IBH~I = 0( nk). Similarly, there is a basis for k-quasi-reversed-Horn 
formulas. 
l logn-CNF formulas: A Boolean function with a CNF representation in which the 
clauses contain at most O(logn) literals. A basis for this class is derived using a 
combinatorial construction called an (n, k) -universal set. An (n, k) -universal set is 
a set of assignments {a,, . . . a,} C (0, 1)” such that every subset of k variables 
assumes all of its 2k possible assignments in the ai’S. It is easy to see that an 
(n, k)-universal set includes a falsifying assignment for any clause of length k and 
therefore it forms a basis for the class of k-CNF formulas. It is known [ 1,161 that 
for k = log n one can construct (n, log n) -universal sets of size 0( n3) and therefore 
IBI~~~-cNFI = Wn3>. 
l Common queries: A function is common if every clause in its CNF representation 
is taken from one of the above classes. The union of the bases for these classes is a 
basis, Bc, for all common functions. We refer to this class as the class of common 
queries. 
3.2. Deduction 
We can now characterize a model-based knowledge base for which the algorithm 
MBR is successful. 
Definition 4. For a function f E F, the set I’ = r; of characteristic models of f is 
the set of all minimal assignments of f with respect to a set B c (0, 1)". Formally, 
r$ = U{z E mp(f)}. 
bEB 
If, in addition, B is a basis for a class G of functions, then we say that ry is the 
model-based representation of f with respect to queries in 9. The following theorems 
describe the basic result of the theory of reasoning with models, its application to 
common queries, and a bound on the size of the model-based representation. 
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Theorem 5 (Khardon and Roth [ 91). Let f be any Boolean function, and cr E 0, 
where B be a basis for 6. Then f k cr if and only if for every u E r;, a(u) = 1. That 
is, model-based deduction using TT, is correct. 
Corollary 6 (Khardon and Roth [9] ). Let f be any Boolean function. Then for any 
common query a, f k a if and only if for every u E TF, (u(u) = 1. That is, model- 
based deduction using rf”“, is correct. 
Theorem 7 (Bshouty [2] ). Let f be any Boolean function, and B a basis. Then, the 
size of the model-based representation off is 
We note that this bound is tight in the sense that for some functions the size of the 
DNF is indeed required. It does however allow for an exponential gap in other cases. 
Namely, there are functions with an exponential-size DNF and a linear-size model-based 
representation [ 91. It is also interesting to compare the size of this representation to 
the size of other representations for functions. Examples in [5] show that there are 
cases where the (Horn CNF) formula representation is small and the model-based 
representation is exponentially large, and vice versa. For a discussion of these issues, as 
well as other properties of characteristic models, see [ 93. 
Example. Let f have the CNF representation 
The function f has 12 (out of the 16 possible) satisfying assignments. The non- 
satisfying assignments of f are: 3 {OOOO,OOOl, 0010,1101}. 
If we want to be able to answer all possible Horn queries with respect to f we 
need to use the Horn basis BH = {1111,1110,1101,1011,0111}. Each of the models 
1111,0111,1011,1110 satisfies f and therefore for each of these, minb ( f) = {b}. For 
b = 1101, the minimal elements can be found by drawing the corresponding lattice and 
checking which of the satisfying assignments of f are minimal. This yields mint tot ( f) = 
{1100,1111,1001,0101}. We therefore get that rf”” = {1111,0111,1011,1100,1001, 
0101, 1110). Note that it includes only 7 out of the 12 satisfying assignments of f. 
Clearly, in general r;H 2 f, and therefore model-based deduction never makes 
mistakes on queries that are implied by f. Furthermore, for the Horn query (~1 = 
xi A x3 + x2, reasoning with rf” will find the counterexample 1011 and deduce 
correctly that f #al. 
We note that in general, if f is given in its CNF representation, solving the problem 
f k LY is co-NP-complete, even when (Y is a Horn query. 
3 An element of (0, I}” denotes an assignment to the variables xt , , xn (i.e., 0011 means xt = x2 = 0, 
andq=x4=1). 
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4. Reasoning within context 
It has been argued that in real life situations, one normally completes a lot of miss- 
ing “context” information when answering queries [ 121. For example, if asked at a 
conference how long it takes to drive to the airport, we would probably assume (un- 
less specified otherwise) that the question refers to the city in which the conference 
is held, rather than to the place where we live (and have been to the airport more 
times). This corresponds to assigning the value “true” to the attribute “here” for the 
purpose of answering the question. Sometimes we need a more expressive language 
to describe our assumptions regarding the current context and assume, say, that some 
rule applies [ 261. For example, we may assume (in the “conference” context) that 
if someone has a car, then it is a rental car. Thus, reasoning within context may be 
viewed as a deduction task, where some additional constraining information is added 
to the knowledge base. Our use of context is closely related to the notion of rele- 
vance, since one can use context information in order to concentrate on the relevant 
knowledge and ignore the irrelevant. Intuitively, this should also make the reasoning 
task easier. Indeed, as we show, this holds in a formal sense when using model-based 
reasoning. 
Let W be a Boolean function that describes our knowledge about the world. A “first 
principle” way to formalize the above intuition is the following: we want to deduce a 
query (Y from W, if (Y can be inferred from W given that the query refers to the current 
context. Namely, the instances of W which are relevant o the query must also satisfy the 
context condition d, a conjunction of some literals and rules. We denote this question 
by W k=d a. 
Notice that it is possible that W kd cy but W p a, if all the satisfying assignments of
W that do not satisfy cr do not satisfy d. Formalized this way, the problem W b=d a is 
equivalent o the problem W A d k a. Thus, a theorem proving approach to reasoning 
does not necessarily provide any computational advantage in solving this reasoning 
problem. 
Let W E 3, cr E 6 and let B be a basis for 9. From Theorem 5 it is clear that given 
GA& the set of characteristic models for W A d, model-based reasoning can be used 
to solve the reasoning problem W A d k a. However, we consider here a more general 
problem: given rg we are interested in performing inference according to /==d with it, 
where the “context condition” d may vary. 
From our model-theoretic definition of the connective b=d it is clear that if one 
has all the models of W then, by filtering out all the models that do not satisfy 
d and performing the model-based test on the remaining models, one answers W A 
d + a correctly. The algorithm C-MBR, presented in Fig. 2 does just that, with the 
set r. 
The following theorems how that, under some conditions, a compact model-based 
representation behaves like the complete set of models of a theory. Namely, the filtering 
algorithm C-MBR provides correct reasoning. 
Theorem 8. Given rg, the algorithm C-MBR correctly solves the reasoning problem 
W k=d a for every d such that B is a basis for d -+ a. 
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Algorithm C-MBR(T, d, a): 
Test set: Consider only those elements of r which satisfy d. 
Test: If there is such an element which does not satisfy (Y, return “No”. 
Otherwise, return “Yes”. 
Fig. 2. C-MBR: model-based reasoning within context. 
Proof. Clearly, W +d cr E W A d k LY E W b z V a E W b (d -+ a). Therefore, 
from Theorem 5, when B is a basis for d -+ a, l$ can be used for model-based 
reasoning with it. Models of W that do not satisfy d are useless as counterexamples 
since d --+ cx always holds and therefore, the test set of Algorithm C-MBR produces the 
correct answer. 0 
Theorem 9. The following conditions on a, B and d guarantee that C-MBR supports 
correct reasoning within context. 
(i) Let cr be a k-quasi-Horn query and B = BH~,,, a basis for (k + r)-quasi-Horn 
theories. If d is a Boolean function that can be represented as a r-quasi-monotone 
DNF then B is a basis for d -+ a. In particular, when k = 1 and r = 0, this 
holds for any Horn formula LY and any monotone Boolean function d. 
(ii) Let (Y be a logn-CNF query and B a basis for 2logn-CNF theories. If d is a 
conjunction of up to logn arbitrary rules (disjunctions) then B is a basis for 
d -+ a. 
Proof. Assume first that d is given as a DNF expression Viclti and cy is given as a 
CNF expression AjEJcj. In this case, 
= A (i$VCj). 
iEI,.iEJ 
For case (i), consider first the case k = 1, r = 0. Since d is monotone, every term in 
a DNF expression for d is monotone, and therefore (q V Cj) is a Horn disjunction. In 
general, every term in d can contribute at most r positive literals, and cj can contribute 
at most k positive literals to (5 V Cj). Therefore, (K V Cj) is in (k + r)-quasi-Horn. 
For case (ii), d is a CNF expression with at most logn clauses, and therefore can be 
written as a DNF expression in which every term has at most logn literals. Therefore 
(< V Cj) has at most 2 log n literals. 
Finally, notice that we do not need to get d as a DNF expression. The analysis uses this 
expression to show that d -+ cy belongs to the desired class, but the algorithm evaluates 
d and (Y directly, using the representation given to it and the filtering algorithm. 0 
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It is interesting to note that the size of the expression for d -+ a described in the 
above proof might be exponentially large. However, it appears only in the analysis. 
We do not actually compute this expression in the algorithm. Rather, filtering examples 
according to d is sufficient. 
Notice that our definition of characteristic models, and ultimately also the set of 
filtered models used in a particular context, depends on the basis B. This may seem 
confusing at first since a class of queries may have more than one possible basis and 
the choice of B is arbitrary. However, note that any basis for the class of queries can 
be used to represent all the queries in this class, and therefore a set of characteristic 
models that is based on it captures all the information needed to reason with the queries. 
This is similar to the situation that arises when representing knowledge using formulas; 
the same Boolean function can be represented in many ways, and even using several 
different representations from the same class (for example, in general there is no unique 
minimal representation for Boolean functions in CNF form). 
The approach presented in this section can be viewed as a process of augmenting a 
model-based representation r with a set of rules. Given a model-based representation 
r$, of W, any rule that holds in W cannot help in answering queries, since it does not 
filter out any assignment of W, and is thus redundant. However, the context rules do 
not hold in W and thus augmenting W with them modifies the set of conclusions. As 
we have shown, in order to reason within context, we need to maintain a model-based 
representation with respect to a basis that is slightly larger than the basis in the pure 
deductive case. 
4.1. Context and relevance 
Our treatment of context information appeals to the intuitive notion of relevance. The 
algorithm C-MBR uses the context information d to filter out the irrelevant information 
in the knowledge base. The irrelevant information in this case is the set of models 
that do not correspond to the current context. The use of a model-based representation 
facilitates efficient filtering, since it only requires evaluating the current context on the 
elements of the representation. A natural approach would be to perform the filtering 
algorithm in the background, whenever the context changes. This way, the reasoning 
itself will be faster since at any time only evaluation on the models of the current context 
is required. 
This should be contrasted with a formula-based representation, where adding context 
information does not necessarily help the computational task. There, the formula d 
is conjuncted with the formula W, and theorem proving is used. Since W A d is not 
necessarily simpler to reason with than W, the task, in general, does not become easier. 
5. Default reasoning with models 
Default reasoning is a formal framework for arguing about typical cases. A default 
rule captures the idea that under normal circumstances we may assume that certain 
conditions, reminiscent of context information, are satisfied. In default reasoning, how- 
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ever, one might have many rules whose conclusions may be conflicting. As a result the 
correct context, that combines these conclusions, is not obvious from the set of rules 
and there may be more than one option for such context. This suggests that default 
reasoning can be viewed as a generalization of reasoning within context where, given a 
query, the agent has to search for a correct context before reasoning. Intuitively, default 
reasoning is, at least partly, aimed at capturing some notion of relevance, by ignoring 
the non-typical (irrelevant) cases. Therefore, the use of defaults is expected to make the 
reasoning problem easier. However, default reasoning is actually harder than deductive 
reasoning, and the computational difficulties can be traced to the above-mentioned search 
for the correct context. Nevertheless, as our results show, in some cases model-based 
representations can capture all the possible contexts in an accessible form, and thus by 
enumerating contexts, or concentrating on one context at a time, an efficient solution 
can be found. 
We will concentrate here on a special case of Reiter’s default logic [ 191, applied to 
propositional logic. 
In Reiter’s default logic, default rules have the form y, which should read as “if CL 
holds and it is consistent to assume p then conclude 7”. The case with p = y is called 
normal defaults, and CY is called a prerequisite. The discussion below considers normal 
defaults with empty prerequisites, denoted by b. 2 In this case, we denote by D the set 
of Boolean functions p, and say that D is the set of default rules. We sometimes treat 
a collection of rules as their conjunction. That is, D(x) = 1 means AdED d(x) = 1. 
Definition 10. For normal defaults with empty prerequisites f we define: A default 
rule is simple if p is a single literal. The rule is positive if p is any monotone function. 
The rule is positive simple if ,LI is a positive literal. 
Notice that the theory for diagnosis [ 211 and the closed world defaults [ 191 can be 
described using simple defaults. 
A default theory is a pair (D, W) where D is a set of default rules, and W is a 
propositional expression. An extension of (D, W) is defined using a fixed point operator 
[ 191. For our special case the following theorem gives an alternative and simpler 
definition: (The operator Th( R) denotes the theorem closure of R.) 
Theorem 11 (Reiter [ 21, p. 881). Let D be a set of normal defaults with empty pre- 
requisites. E is an extension of (D, W) if and only if E = Th( W A S) , for some maximal 
subset4 S of D such that W A S is consistent. 
Using this theorem as the definition for extension we can identify a maximal consistent 
subset S with each extension E. We denote this subset by SE. Since SE is consistent 
with W, we get that an extension E includes q if and only if W A SE b q. In the 
original formalization [ 191 a knowledge base is defined to imply a query if there is 
4 To avoid confusion we emphasize that S and D are considered as sets of rules. S is maximal in the sense 
that no additional rule can be added to it while preserving consistency with W. Thus, if S1 C S2, the Boolean 
function S2 is the conjunction of more rules and therefore S2 + .SI 
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an extension in which the query holds. Following [6,29] we call this task credulous 
default reasoning; the case in which all extensions are taken into consideration is called 
skeptical default reasoning. 
Formally, the credulous default reasoning task CDEF( D, W, q) is defined as follows: 
given a default theory (D, W) and a propositional expression q, decide whether there 
exists an extension E of (D, W) such that q E E. 
The skeptical default reasoning task SDEF( D, W, q) is defined as follows: given a 
default theory (D, W) and a propositional expression q, decide whether for all the 
extensions E of (D, W), q E E. 
Clearly, if W is consistent with the set of all rules in D, then there is only one 
maximal consistent subset S of D, the one which contains all these rules. In this case 
both credulous and skeptical default reasoning reduce to reasoning within the context 
D, as discussed earlier. The main difficulty which arises in the general case is that W 
may not be consistent with all of D. 
Next we present positive results on default reasoning using a model-based represen- 
tation. As in the case of deductive reasoning [9], the efficient results we present hold 
in cases where there is no known efficient solution when reasoning with formulas. The 
exact complexity relation is somewhat more subtle than in the deductive case. There, 
efficient solutions where presented for problems that are NP-hard (under randomized 
reductions) given a formula-based representation. In the current case, the default rea- 
soning task is NP-hard [28] when the knowledge base is Horn, all the default rules 
are positive literals, and the query is a single positive literal. Our results provide an 
algorithm for this class of problems, which is polynomial in the size of the model-based 
representation. This representation, though, may be exponential in the size of the Horn 
expression, as is the case, for example, for the problems used in the reduction in [ 281. 
Thus, strictly speaking, we do not prove an advantage in this special case. Nevertheless, 
our results provide efficient algorithms in cases where they were not known to exist 
before. 
We present two algorithms, CD-MBR and SD-MBR, which handle the credulous 
and skeptical default reasoning tasks, respectively. Both algorithms are similar to the 
abduction algorithm5 developed in 151 and used in [91. 
5.1. Credulous default reasoning 
We start by describing the algorithm CD-MBR, which is presented in Fig. 3. Let r = 
TW be a model-based representation of W. (The monotone basis will be defined later.) 
The algorithm CD-MBR receives r, D and a query q as input. It starts by enumerating 
all the models in r. When it finds a model z in which the query holds (i.e., q( z ) = 1) , 
it sets S to be the set of all the rules in D that this model satisfies. The algorithm then 
tests whether W A S k q by calling the procedure C-MBR to decide whether W bs q. 
If the answer is “Yes” the algorithm returns “Yes”; otherwise, it continues to test the 
next model in r. If all the models in r have been scanned and no good extension has 
been found the algorithm says “No”. 
5 Our results were inspired by the connections between abduction and default reasoning developed in 1251. 
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Algorithm CD-MBR(T, D, q): 
Do for all models z E r such that q( z ) = 1 
Let S= {d E D 1 d(z) = 1) 
If C-MBR( r, S, q) answers “Yes”, return “Yes”. 
EndDo 
Return “No”. I* No extension found *I 
Fig. 3. CD-MBR: default reasoning with a model-based representation. 
Assume the algorithm is run with a model-based representation r = rf: and the query 
presented to it is q. The following two conditions on B and D are used to characterize 
the cases in which the algorithm is successful. 
Condition 12. B is a basis for 5’ --f q, for all S c D. 
Condition 13. For all S G D, for all u such that S(U) = 1, there is a prime implicant 
t of S, and a basis element b E B, such that t(u) = t(b) = 1. 
Theorem 14. Given rk, the algorithm CD-MBR solves the credulous default reasoning 
task CDEF( D, W q) correctly, whenever Condition 12 and Condition 13 hold. 
Proof. We need to prove: 
(i) if the algorithm returns “Yes” then the desired extension exists, and 
(ii) if there is an extension that contains q, then the algorithm returns “Yes”. 
For (i), since Condition 12 holds, Theorem 8 implies that C-MBR is correct, that is, 
W A S k q. By construction, S is a subset of D for which WA S is consistent. If S* > S 
is a maximal subset of D (with respect to the property of consistency with W), then 
clearly W A S* k W A S k q, and the required extension exists. 
For (ii), assume that there is an extension E that contains q. By definition, the 
existence of E implies that there exists a subset SE C D such that W A SE is consistent 
and, WA SE + q. Thus, there is an assignment u E W such that SE(U) = 1 and therefore 
also q(u) = 1. 
Condition 13 implies that there exists a prime implicant t of SE and a basis element 
b E B such that SE(U) = t(u) = t(b) = 1. Thus, u, and b agree on all the literals that 
appear in t, and therefore for all z such that z &, U, t( z ) = SE(Z) = 1. Thus, if w E I$, 
is such that w &, u (and since u E W, w like that always exists), then SE(W) = 1 and 
since W A SE /= q also q(w) = 1. 
Now, consider the set S that the algorithm CD-MBR uses in the iteration for w E r$. 
By construction the algorithm will compute a set which is identical to SE. (The set 
clearly includes SE since SE(W) = 1, and is exactly SE since SE is maximal.) The 
answer returned by C-MBR is correct, due to Condition 12 and Theorem 8. Therefore 
the algorithm correctly responds “Yes”. 0 
The following lemmas identify cases in which the required conditions hold. 
184 R. Khardon, D. Roth/Art@cial Intelligence 97 (1997) 169-l 93 
Lemma 15. If the set D of defaults consists of 
(i) positive defaults, or 
(ii) simple defaults with 6 r negative literals, or 
(iii) up to log n default rules, 
then there is a small basis which satis$es Condition 13. 
Proof. For (i), since D is a set of positive defaults, every prime implicant of S 2 D is 
a monotone term, and b = 1” satisfies the condition. That is, the Condition 13 holds for 
every monotone basis that contains 1”. For (ii), every subset S G D is a conjunction 
of literals, and S has a single prime implicant, itself. Thus, every basis which includes 
an assignment in which all the negative literals of S assigned 0, and all other literals 
assigned 1, satisfies Condition 13. In particular, if D contains up to r negative literals, 
so does every subset of it S, and the basis &.tr suffices. For (iii), every subset S & D 
has a CNF expression with at most logn clauses, and therefore also a DNF expression 
in which every term has at most logn literals. Therefore, if u satisfies S, u also satisfies 
a prime implicant t with no more than logn literals. Thus, if the monotone basis B 
contains an (n, log n) universal set, Condition 13 holds, since t must satisfy at least one 
of the elements there. 0 
The following definition captures the cases for which model-based default reasoning 
is correct: 
Definition 16. The following cases describe simultaneous restrictions on classes 
(D, &, r) that guarantee efficient solution for the default reasoning problem. We denote 
these cases by 7D (for tractable defaults). 
(i) D: a set of positive defaults; &: the class of k-quasi-Horn queries. The corre- 
sponding model-based representation: r = r$. 
(ii) D: a set of simple defaults with up to r negative literals; &: the class of k- 
quasi-Horn queries. The corresponding model-based representation: r = .Fr. 
(iii) D: a set of at most logn default rules (disjunctions); Q: the class of logn-CNF 
queries. The corresponding model-based representation: r = r31w ‘K~. 
Lemma 17. Condition 12 and Condition 13 are satisfied for all (D, &, r) in TD. 
Proof. Condition 12 holds as a direct consequence of Theorem 9. 
Condition 13 holds as a direct implication of Lemma 15: For (i), since 1” E But+,. 
For (ii), since BH, C BH~+, , and for (iii), since B2 togn_c~r contains a (n, log n) -universal 
set. 0 
Using Theorem 14 and Lemma 17 we get: 
Corollary 18. The algorithm CD-MBR solves the credulous default reasoning task 
CDEF( D, W, q) correctly, for all q E Q and for all (D, &, T) in TV. 
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Algorithm SD-MBR(I’, D, q): 
If for all models z E r q( z ) = 0, return “No”. 
Do for all models z E r such that q( z ) = 1 
LetS={dED(d(z)=l} 
S,,, = max /* Consider S as a potential maximal subset */ 
Do for all d E D \ S 
if there exists y E r such that W(y) = 1, S(y) = 1, and d(y) = 1 
then S&, = no-r~~~ 
EndDo 
If S,,, = max and C-MBR( r, S, q) answers “No”, return “No”. 
EndDo 
Return “Yes”. I* All extensions are good *I 
Fig. 4. SD-MBR: default reasoning with a model-based representation. 
5.2. Skeptical default reasoning 
The only difference between the credulous and the skeptical reasoning tasks is that 
in the latter we respond affirmatively only if the query holds in all extensions rather 
than just in one. A legitimate extension is a maximal subset of the set D of default 
rules. For credulous default reasoning it was sufficient to guarantee that all the maximal 
sets are considered as candidates, and it was not important that some non-maximal sets 
were considered as well (since they could not affect the response of the algorithm). For 
skeptical reasoning, we need to identify the maximal sets, since a consistent subset S 
which is not maximal might satisfy W A S # q while every maximal subset SE which 
includes S satisfies W A SE /= q. Therefore, the main stage of the algorithm SD-MBR, 
presented in Fig. 4, tests for maximal subsets. 
Let r = Tw be a model-based representation of IV. The algorithm SD-MBR receives 
r, D and a query q as input. It starts by enumerating all the models in r. When it 
finds a model z in which the query holds (i.e., q(z) = l), it sets S to be the set 
of all the rules in D that this model satisfies. The algorithm then tests whether S is 
indeed a maximal consistent subset, by checking whether there is any superset of S 
that is consistent with W. (In the correctness proof of the algorithm we show that 
it is sufficient to test this condition using elements of r.) If S is not maximal then 
it is ignored and the algorithm goes on to the next assignment in r. Otherwise, the 
algorithm tests whether WA S b q by calling the procedure C-MBR to decide whether 
W /=s q. If the answer is “No” the algorithm returns “No”, and otherwise it continues 
to look for another maximal set S. If all the models in r, and the corresponding subsets 
of D, have been tested and no bad extension has been found then the algorithm says 
“Yes”. 
Theorem 19. Given r&, the algorithm SD-MBR solves the skeptical default reasoning 
task SDEF( D, K q) correctly whenever Condition 12 and Condition 13 hold. 
186 R. Khardon, D. Roth/Artijicial Intelligence 97 (1997) 169-193 
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 14. We need to prove: 
(i) if the algorithm returns “Yes” then all extensions contain q, and 
(ii) if all extensions contain q, then the algorithm returns “Yes”. 
Consider first case (i) . The proof of Theorem 14 shows that every extension S is indeed 
considered, for some z E r. Since an extension S is maximal, it passes the inner loop 
test in SD-MBR. That is, no superset of S which is consistent with W is found. Therefore 
all extensions are passed to the subroutine for C-MBR, which gives a correct answer. 
Thus, if the algorithm returns “Yes” then all extensions contain q. 
For (ii) we have that all extensions contain q. Assume first that there exists z E Z$, 
such that q( z ) = 1, and therefore the algorithm passes the first step and goes into the 
inner loop. We argue that all the subsets S identified as extensions (i.e., flagged max 
after the inner loop) indeed correspond to extensions. Assume that S is not maximal 
and that for some d, S* = S A d is consistent with W. Consider the iteration in the 
inner loop in which d is the candidate added to S. Since S* is consistent with W we 
know that there is some u E W such that s* (u) = 1. But, Condition 13 holds for 
S* as well, and therefore there is a y E r which satisfies S*. Thus, the algorithm 
will detect this fact, set $a, = no-max, and ignore S as required. As in case (i) we 
know that the answers of C-MBR are correct and thus the algorithm says “Yes” as 
required. 
We now prove that, as assumed above, there exists z E rk such that q( z ) = 1. 
Notice that since all extensions contain q, for all extensions, and in particular for some 
extension E, there exists x E W A SE A q. As above this implies that there is also a 
y E ri satisfying this, and thus the assumption holds. 0 
Using Theorem 19 and Lemma 17 we get: 
Corollary 20. The algorithm SD-MBR solves the skeptical default reasoning task 
SDEF( D, W q) correctly, for all q E & and for all (D, Q, r> in ‘TV. 
5.3. Application: Diagnosis using models 
One of the useful applications of default logic is for the problem of circuit diagnosis 
[ 211. Consider for example the circuit d +- a A b; e +- d V c, composed of one and 
gate and one or gate. In order to diagnose possible problems in the circuit we add, for 
every gate, a new variable denoting that it is operating normally. In our example Ni 
will correspond to the and gate and N2 will correspond to the or gate. Using these new 
variables, the functionality of the circuit can be described by 
W = (Nlab -+ d)(Nld ---f a)(Nld -+ b)(Nzc ---f e)(Nzd --+ e)(Nze --+ cvd). 
Under normal conditions we want to assume that all the gates are operating normally. 
This is captured in our example by the set of positive simple default rules D = { 2, $}, 
and in general by having one rule for each gate’s “normality” variable. 
In the absence of any further evidence, considering the default problem ( W, D) reveals 
that there is only one extension, D. This should be interpreted as stating that all the 
gates are operating normally. 
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Algorithm Diug-MBR(T, 0, D, q): 
Let ro = {z E r 1 O(z) = 1). 
Call SD-MBR( ro, D, q) and answer in the same way. 
Fig. 5. Diag-MBR: model-based diagnostic reasoning. 
Suppose, however, that we observe that c = 1 and e = 0. In such a case the circuit can 
be described as W’ = W A cZ, and we need to consider the default reasoning problem 
( W', 0). It is easy to see that in this case there is only one extension which includes N1 
but does not include N2. This should be interpreted as stating that a minimal explanation 
for the fault is that gate number 2 is faulty. 
Of course, it is not always the case that observations exactly determine the fault in 
the circuit. Suppose, for example, that we observe a = 1, b = 1, and e = 0. In this case 
W’ = W r\abZ, and ( W’, D) has two extensions. In one extension we have Ni but not N2 
and in the other we have N2 but not Nt. This identifies the possible scenarios that could 
have caused the fault in the circuit; either the and gate or the or gate are not functioning 
correctly. If we want to know whether the circuit implies d -+ a, it makes sense to use 
the skeptical default reasoning paradigm with (W’, D) and the query d + a. This has 
the following interpretation: “can d -+ a be deduced without knowing the specifics of 
the fault?’ It is easy to see that the answer is “No” (due to the case Ni = 0). 
We now show how to apply our positive results for default reasoning to the problem of 
diagnosis. Observe that in the problem of diagnosis our knowledge about the world varies 
with the observations. Therefore the observations serve as a kind of context information. 
On top of that we have to support the default rules that capture the assumptions on 
the normality of the gates. This suggests the algorithm Diag-MBR, described in Fig. 5. 
The algorithm first uses filtering as in C-MBR, where the observations 0 serve as the 
context information. Then it uses the set of filtered models as the knowledge base for 
the algorithm SD-MBR. 
As the following theorem shows, for the strategy to succeed it is sufficient that the 
expression (0 ---) (S -+ q) > is supported as a query by the characteristic models. 
Theorem 21. The algorithm Diag-MBR solves the diagnosis task correctly as long as 
0 includes at most r observations, q is a k-quasi-Horn expression, and I’ = l$?. 
Proof. Given the set of observation 0, the requirement is to solve the default task 
SDEF( D, (W A 0), q). As in Theorem 19 we need to show that all extensions are 
considered by the algorithm, and that the subroutine for reasoning within context is 
used properly. 
Let SE be an extension of WA 0. Namely, there is a model u E WA 0 A SE. Since SE 
is a subset of D it includes only positive literals. Also, by the conditions of the theorem, 
0 has at most r literals (and therefore at most r negative literals). This implies that 
BH~,. includes an assignment b which agrees with both 0 and SE on all literals. Thus, 
there is an assignment z E r, z <b u such that z agrees with b and u on all the literals 
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in SE and 0. The assignment z will survive the filtering stage of the algorithm, and the 
extension SE will be properly identified. (Note that as before, if the algorithm claims 
that an extension is maximal then it is maximal since otherwise it would be detected 
due to the existence of z.) 
When an extension S is identified by the algorithm SD-MBR, it uses a subroutine 
call to C-MBR to test whether the question q follows given the context S. In our case, 
the question is whether (W A 0) ks q which is equivalent to W A 0 A S k q. Using 
Theorem 8 we get that this is answered correctly as long as B is a basis for 5 V 3 V q. 
Since S is monotone, and 0 has at most r literals this holds in our case. 0 
5.4. Default reasoning and relevance 
The use of defaults in reasoning is motivated by the desire to allow for efficient 
decision-making in the presence of incomplete information. The goal is to exploit the 
information given with respect to “typical” cases, namely, the default rules, when it is 
relevant to the current situation. Moreover, this process of identifying the relevant cases 
should, intuitively, contribute somehow to reducing the complexity of reasoning. 
However, it turns out that when using default logic as the default reasoning framework, 
this goal is missed. While each rule in the representation constitutes a local assumption, 
a set of default rules tries to capture all plausible scenarios, and the default reasoning 
task is defined in relation to all these scenarios. In fact, the computational difficulties in 
default logic can be traced to this search for possible scenarios. 
As we have shown, the relation of defaults to relevance can be viewed through 
the notion of context. Namely, default reasoning can be viewed as a generalization 
of reasoning within context where the agent has to find plausible context information 
through the use of default rules. We have also shown that model-based representations 
can, in some cases, capture all possible extensions in an accessible form. In these cases, 
one can consider one context at a time and use the filtering technique in order to focus 
on the relevant information in each of these contexts. This is shown to yield efficient 
default reasoning algorithms. 
6. Relevance to the task 
The view we take on common-sense reasoning is that the agent has to function in 
a very complex world that may be hard to represent exactly. Luckily, the agent need 
not be omniscient, but rather has to perform well on a fairly wide, but restricted, set 
of tasks. Given that we relax the requirements, the question is whether the agent needs 
a complete description of the world in order to reason correctly with respect to it, or 
perhaps, can perform as well using only partial information that is relevant to the task. 
One way to study this issue is via our notion of relevance-a way to reduce the 
computational cost of reasoning. While before we used relevance or context information 
to prune the knowledge representation for a particular situation, it is also possible to 
prune a knowledge representation relative to the general task the agent is supposed to 
perform. 
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Consider the deduction problem, and suppose that our agent were to wander in a 
world in which all queries are restricted in some form, or belong to some language 
&. This means that the agent needs to answer correctly only queries in &, and may 
(potentially) be wrong on queries not in Q, as it is not going to be queried on those 
anyway. 
In this case, it is known that an incomplete description of the world is sufficient to 
support correct deduction. This can be formalized using the notion of a least upper bound 
representation, i troduced by Kautz and Selman [ 271. Intuitively, these approximations 
capture all the conclusions of W which belong to 8. In [9] it is shown that these 
approximations support exact deduction with respect queries in Q. 
In fact, the model-based representations that we have used earlier in the paper capture 
such approximations relative to the class of queries. Thus, our results implicitly use the 
notion of relevance to the task as well. Moreover, the use of model-based representations 
is essential to exploit the relevance to the task. The reason is that the representation 
should be in a form that supports efficient solutions of the reasoning problem. For 
example, suppose the task is answering logn-CNF queries. Given a CNF representation 
of the least upper bound of W with respect to logn-CNF it is NP-hard to reason 
with this representation and therefore not feasible. The existence of a compact model- 
based representation of this least upper bound, enables us to perform the reasoning 
efficiently. 
7. Learning to reason 
The results presented in previous sections support an incremental view of reasoning 
in a natural way. We have shown that a model-based representation can be used to 
reason correctly when some additional constraining context information is supplied. 
This information augments the agents’ knowledge and aids in deriving conclusions 
relevant to this context. We call this a top-down solution, since it assumes that the agent 
has a complete knowledge base, but uses only parts of it, depending on the current 
context. 
It is conceivable, though, for an agent to have only some of the models, those models 
that come from some specific context d. In such a case, our results show that the 
agent reasons correctly within this context (although not within every context). We call 
this a bottom-up approach. This approach supports the view that an intelligent agent 
can construct a representation of the world incrementally by pasting together many 
“narrower” views from different contexts. In each of those, the agent is guaranteed to 
reason correctly and, eventually, it constructs a more complete knowledge base, which 
supports many possible contexts, even those never experienced. 
This intuitive approach can be cast in a more general framework which emphasizes 
the inductive nature of reasoning. In systems that learn, the world in which the agent 
performs its task is the same world that supplies the agent with the information when 
learning. This intuition is captured in the distribution free model of learning theory [ 301. 
There, an agent first wanders around in the world, observing examples drawn from some 
unknown distribution D which governs the occurrences of instances in the world. Then, 
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the agent has to perform its task, namely to classify instances. The agent is allowed 
to err on some set of instances as long as the measure of this set under D is small. 
Thus, the same arbitrary “world” that supplies the information in the learning phase is 
used to measure the agent’s performance later. This intuition was not captured by early 
formulations of reasoning, where the agent has an exact formula-based description of 
the world (traditionally, a CNF formula), and its performance is defined in some way 
that does not depend on the world it functions in (e.g., by the ability to make arbitrary 
deductions). 
In [ 71 a general framework Learning to Reason is defined, that incorporates the 
ideas above into the study of reasoning. In this framework the intelligent agent is given 
access to its favorite learning interface, and is also given a grace period in which it can 
interact with this interface and construct its representation6 KB of the world W. The 
reasoning performance is measured only after this period, when the agent is presented 
with queries cy from some query language, relevant to the world, and has to answer 
whether W implies cy. 
This framework allows for a formal study of yet another manifestation of our notion 
of relevance as a way to reduce the computational cost of reasoning. In this case we 
may call it relevance to the environment. Namely, the performance of an agent has to 
be measured by some criterion that depends on the world the agent functions in. Indeed, 
it is shown in [7] that through this interaction with the world, the agent truly gains 
additional reasoning power. 
We briefly describe two results which emphasize how, within this framework, agents 
can focus on relevant information and what they gain from using it. As before, these 
results rely on the use of model-based representations. 
A sampling approach 
Suppose we have access to random examples from a certain context d in our world 
W (e.g., the “conference” context discussed above). This may allow us to take random 
samples according to the distribution D that governs the occurrences of instances in 
W A d. It can be shown [ 71 that a sample of m = (p/e) ln( l/S) random examples 
can answer correctly all questions of length < p, which are not evasive. A statement 
is evasive if it is not implied by the world but, in practice, it is falsified very rarely. 
(Formally, (Y is evasive if W A d w cr but PrD [ W A d A Z] < E.) 
This exemplifies the notion of relevance to the environment: the environment the agent 
interacts with is defined by the distribution D, and the queries the agent cares about 
(the non-evasive queries) are defined relative to this environment. 
Notice that this is very similar to the usage of model-based representations in the 
framework for reasoning within context. Now, instead of having a fixed and well defined 
set of models, which supports exact reasoning, a random set is used and we require only 
probably-approximately-correct reasoning. 
h Note that in this framework we need to distinguish between the world W and the agent’s representation 
KB. 
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Theory approximation and restricted queries 
The utility of knowledge approximations for capturing information relevant to the task 
was discussed in Section 6. We note that the use of these approximations is advantageous 
for other reasons as well. In [7] it is shown that while exact learning of functions is 
still not within reach, one can learn the model-based representations for the least upper 
bound approximations of functions. Thus, one can learn such approximations, in the 
appropriate environment, and then use it for reasoning, combining the ideas of relevance 
to the task and relevance to the environment. 
8. Conclusions 
Reasoning with models is an intuitive paradigm that has been shown to be theoret- 
ically sound. In this paper we presented more evidence for the utility of model-based 
representations. In particular, these representations support efficient reasoning in the 
presence of varying context information, as well as some restricted cases of default rea- 
soning. We further argued that the notion of relevance can be naturally and successfully 
utilized when reasoning with models. 
The basic computational task we considered is the problem of reasoning within a 
varying context. We modeled this situation by augmenting the knowledge we have 
about the world with context-specific information, and showed how to solve this task 
efficiently using a model-based representation. Our solution, the filtering algorithm, 
directly implements the idea of ignoring irrelevant information. 
In default reasoning, an agent may have many (possibly conflicting) default rules, 
acquired in different contexts. As we have shown, the relation of defaults to rele- 
vance can be viewed through the notion of context. Namely, default reasoning can 
be viewed as a generalization of reasoning within context where the agent has to 
find plausible context information through the use of default rules. Furthermore, un- 
der certain restrictions, model-based representations capture all possible scenarios in 
an accessible form and this can be exploited to yield efficient default reasoning algo- 
rithms. 
The significance of these results is that they are achieved as natural extensions of 
deductive reasoning, and hold in cases in which the traditional formula-based represen- 
tation does not support efficient reasoning. 
Moreover, we have shown that these results support an incremental view of reasoning 
in a natural way, and discussed the Learning to Reason framework and the notion of 
relevance as manifested in it. In particular, within this framework it has been shown that 
the model-based representations discussed here can be learned efficiently. This can be 
combined with context specific default rules that are acquired via rote learning or other 
learning processes [24] to work in a plausible way. 
These results can be viewed as providing some theoretical support for the usefulness 
of case-based style reasoning, where a set of “typical cases” is used as a knowledge 
representation. More work is needed in order to gain a deeper understanding of these 
issues. 
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We believe that an effective use of the relevant information is an important part of 
any efficient solution of the reasoning task. In this respect, model-based representations 
serve as a good example, since they allow to exploit various aspects of relevance in a 
natural way. 
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